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The existence of so-called ‘basic emotions’ and their defining attributes represents a
long lasting and yet unsettled issue in psychology. Recently, neuroimaging evidence,
especially related to the advent of neuroimaging meta-analytic methods, has revitalized
this debate in the endeavor of systems and human neuroscience. The core theme
focuses on the existence of unique neural bases that are specific and characteristic for
each instance of basic emotion. Here we review this evidence, outlining contradictory
findings, strengths and limits of different approaches. Constructionism dismisses the
existence of dedicated neural structures for basic emotions, considering that the
assumption of a one-to-one relationship between neural structures and their functions
is central to basic emotion theories. While these critiques are useful to pinpoint
current limitations of basic emotions theories, we argue that they do not always
appear equally generative in fostering new testable accounts on how the brain relates
to affective functions. We then consider evidence beyond PET and fMRI, including
results concerning the relation between basic emotions and awareness and data from
neuropsychology on patients with focal brain damage. Evidence from lesion studies are
indeed particularly informative, as they are able to bring correlational evidence typical
of neuroimaging studies to causation, thereby characterizing which brain structures are
necessary for, rather than simply related to, basic emotion processing. These other
studies shed light on attributes often ascribed to basic emotions, such as automaticity
of perception, quick onset, and brief duration. Overall, we consider that evidence in
favor of the neurobiological underpinnings of basic emotions outweighs dismissive
approaches. In fact, the concept of basic emotions can still be fruitful, if updated to
current neurobiological knowledge that overcomes traditional one-to-one localization of
functions in the brain. In particular, we propose that the structure-function relationship
between brain and emotions is better described in terms of pluripotentiality, which refers
to the fact that one neural structure can fulfill multiple functions, depending on the
functional network and pattern of co-activations displayed at any given moment.
Keywords: basic emotions, fMRI meta-analysis, lesion studies, blindsight, visual awareness, pluripotentiality,
neuropsychology
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INTRODUCTION
Any textbook on neuroscience, psychobiology or
neuropsychology includes a chapter with a summary on
emotions. Although extensively studied, an unequivocal
definition of emotions is still lacking and the subject of
contentions. For example, in the 1980’s, Fehr and Russell (1984,
p. 464) wrote that “Everyone knows what an emotion is, until
asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows.”
Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) considered 92 definitions
and 9 skeptical descriptions produced by scientists in the field,
which effectively represent the lack of consensus with regard to
the characteristics that define the concept of emotion and its
usefulness in the scientific framework.
Clearly, differences and idiosyncrasies in relation to the
general concept of emotions are reflected in the construct of ‘basic
emotions’; a view that purports the existence of a small number
of so-called primary emotions, usually comprising fear, anger,
joy, sadness, surprise and disgust. Indeed, there are different
theories of, and different approaches to, basic emotions, as
well as variable taxonomies of emotions, which are not entirely
superimposable (Galati, 1993; Tracy and Randles, 2011). Besides
specific differences, supporters of the existence of basic emotions,
such as Ekman, Tomkins, Izard, Plutchik, Levenson, and
Panksepp share some fundamental assumptions derived from
an evolutionistic Darwinian approach (Tomkins, 1962; Plutchik,
1980; Izard, 1994; Levenson, 1994; Panksepp, 1998; Ekman,
1999). This approach suggests that emotions have developed
and got selected because of their adaptive value, meaning
that, through some automatic mechanisms, they are capable of
regulating the interaction with the proximal environment, while
at the same time providing effective responses, both instrumental
and communicative, in relation to the relevant situation for
survival (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990; Shariff and Tracy, 2011).
In contrast, psychological construction theories argue against
the innateness of emotions. These theories emphasize that the
different types of emotions emerge from a construction process.
That is, basic psychological operations, such as perception,
attention and memory, combine to generate an emotional
meaning that is influenced by social and linguistic factors (Barrett
and Russell, 2015). A particular psychological construction view,
the Conceptual Act Theory (CAT) (Barrett et al., 2015; Barrett,
2017), claims that each emotional episode is built up by the brain
from the combination of core affect (a representation of raw
sensations related to the body) and a categorization process based
upon prior experience and mediated by conceptual and linguistic
knowledge (Barrett, 2006, 2014, 2017).
This longstanding debate has been revitalized by a series of
quantitative meta-analyses drawing on the impressive amount
of data produced by functional magnetic resonance (fMRI)
and positron emission tomography (PET) studies. The goal
of these meta-analyses was to examine the invariance of the
relationship between certain neural structures and some basic
emotions. Since it is on this methodological ground that the
constructionist approach has recently concentrated to draw
arguments on the non-existence of the neural correlates of basic
emotions, we will start with a brief review of these fMRI/PET
meta-analytical studies. Then, we will consider which model
of relationship between neural structures and psychological
functions supports the criticisms of the constructionist approach
to basic emotions. We will propose an approach that retains the
value of basic emotions, but revises some drawbacks and confers
better neurobiological plausibility to this concept. Lastly, we will
review other neuroscientific evidence that, in our opinion, is
consistent with the existence of basic emotions.
TERMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Emotions are often conceived as composite and multi-
component constructs, including the evaluation of an external
stimulus, neural responses and the related psychophysiological
reactions, expression modifications, instrumental actions and,
lastly, experiential and subjective psychological components
related to such changes (see Scherer, 2009; Adolphs, 2017 for
examples). As a function of the multi-componential nature
of the more general concept of emotion, the basic-ness of
emotions could be investigated following three different profiles:
conceptual, psychological, and biological (Ortony and Turner,
1990; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011).
From a conceptual perspective, the notion of basic emotions
refers to logical-formal criteria that define the existence of
some categories within taxonomies. In that regard, a concept is
considered to be basic if it contributes to create the most abstract
category within a hierarchy where the elements share a certain
number of common properties that are sufficient to determine
whether a single element belongs to that category (Scarantino
and Griffiths, 2011). For example, following the works of Rosch
(1973), the category “dog” is a basic category because it represents
the most abstract category of which it is possible to create a
mental image, it is always used by adults, and learned rapidly
by children during language learning. The subordinate categories
(i.e., German Shepherd, Dachshund) share some common
attributes, but these are not very differentiated. The superordinate
categories (i.e., mammals) share few common attributes and
differ greatly from one another.
From a psychological perspective, an emotion is basic only
if it does not contain another emotion; that is, if it represents
an atomic, irreducible psychological construct. Emotions that are
not deemed basic are variously interpreted as resulting from the
integration of basic emotions, or from the integration of basic
emotions and cognitive functions (but see Pessoa, 2010 on the
fuzzy distinction between emotion and cognition; and LeDoux
and Brown, 2017 for emotions as higher-order states integrated
with cognition). For example, hostility can be considered a mix
of anger and disgust, sociability derives from the combination of
joy and acceptance, and guilt melts feelings of pleasure and fear
(Plutchik, 1994).
Lastly, by claiming that an emotion is biologically basic, it
is assumed that there is an innate, hardwired mechanism that
links, for example, the processing of a sensory input that signals
potential danger with the production of a coordinated pattern
of behavioral responses such as freezing or flight. Arguably, this
is the notion of basicness that most researchers have in mind
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when referring to basic emotions. Ekman (1999) proposed that
basic emotions have the following characteristics: (1) distinctive
universal signals (e.g., facial expressions); (2) universal and
distinct antecedents (e.g., the sight of a snake in the grass);
(3) characteristic physiological correlates; (4) are induced by an
automatic processing (i.e., non-conscious or involuntary); (5)
emerge early in ontogeny; (6) are present in other non-human
primates; (7) have rapid onset; (8) are of short duration; (9) are
not controlled voluntarily; (10) are associated with distinctive
thoughts, memories and images, as well as with (11) distinctive
subjective experience.
Although it may appear that the conceptual, psychological,
and biological approaches to basic emotions converge, this is not
necessarily the case. Moreover, different meanings assigned to the
same word, for example ‘fear,’ can cause additional confusion.
In this respect, LeDoux (2012, 2014; LeDoux and Brown, 2017)
has clarified the confusion that can arise when we conflate
terms that refer to different processes, i.e., processes related to
the conscious experience with those that refer to the reflex-like
processing of stimuli and the triggering of responses, and when
assuming that the brain mechanism that underlie the two types
of processes are the same. From a neuroscientific perspective, the
biological basicness of emotions holds meaning and value only
if neurobiological underpinnings characteristically associated to
different instances of emotions can be found. Indeed, while
Ekman (1999, p. 50) never addressed the issue directly, he
nevertheless posited that “there must be unique physiological
patterns for each emotion, and these (central nervous system)
patterns should be specific to these emotions not found in other
mental activity” (emphasis in the original).
META-ANALYTIC STUDIES
Meta-analysis is used to quantitatively assess the results of a set
of studies and evaluate the replicability and statistical robustness
of individual data studies, which are often based on limited
sample size and statistical power (Wager et al., 2009; Radua et al.,
2012). Meta-analysis thus adopts a specific method to address
the common theme of cognitive and affective neuroscience;
that is, to define the relationship between neural structures and
mental functions; emotions the present case. The first meta-
analysis on the neural correlates of emotions was conducted
on 55 neuroimaging studies (PET and fMRI) to determine
whether the different emotions present common or specific
neural activation patterns and, in the second case, which brain
regions are associated with each emotion (Phan et al., 2002).
The semi-quantitative analysis enabled isolating different brain
regions associated with different emotions. In particular, the
processing of fear and sadness was associated with activation
of the amygdala and cingulate cortex, respectively, while joy
and disgust were associated with increased metabolic activity
in the basal ganglia (Phan et al., 2002). Conversely, the mesial
prefrontal cortex was generally and extensively involved in all
the emotions studied. These results were partly confirmed by a
subsequent meta-analysis of 106 PET and fMRI studies (Murphy
et al., 2003). The authors found that specific brain regions were
activated for fear (amygdala), disgust (insula and globus pallidus)
and anger (lateral orbitofrontal cortex) and reported activations
in the cingulate cortex for fear and, in part, for joy. The findings
of these first meta-analyses thus appear to be fairly coherent with
physiology and neuropsychological data from animals, which
have revealed deficits in the recognition and expression of specific
basic emotions as a result of focal lesions in the areas reported by
the meta-analyses (see below).
Over the years, more sophisticated methods have been
implemented that have helped to make the results of meta-
analyses more precise from an anatomical as well as statistical
point of view. In particular, these new methods enable
to maintain the spatial information related to the original
coordinates of activation, instead of converting them into macro-
regions to divide the brain into sections of equal volume,
as in the earlier works just mentioned. Vytal and Hamann
(2010) used the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) technique
(Turkeltaub et al., 2002). With this method, it is possible to
preserve the three-dimensional spatial coordinates that define
the areas activated in the original studies at the level of each
voxel, the smallest spatial unit in fMRI. The authors pair-wise
compared the activation maps of single emotions (e.g., Fear
vs. Anger, Fear vs. Joy, etc.), showing that each basic emotion
is associated with a distinct pattern of brain activity. More
precisely, the results indicate that fear is related to activation of
the amygdala and insula, anger to orbitofrontal cortex, disgust to
anterior insula, the ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala,
happiness to activation of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex
and sadness to the medial prefrontal cortex and the caudal
anterior cingulate cortex. Note, therefore, that the study by Vytal
and Hamann (2010) did not report a one-to-one relationship
between structure and function, nor did it uniquely associate an
emotion with a single neural structure, but with a network that
may contain structures involved in the processing of more than
one basic emotion. Kirby and Robinson (2015) replicated Vytal
and Hamann results regarding consistency and specificity across
basic emotions, using the BrainMap database to undertaking an
ALE meta-analysis on each emotion (Laird et al., 2005). They
concluded that a neural profile for each basic emotion seems
to exist, and they suggested that a multi-system model with
distributed networks differentiating each emotion should replace
the traditional locationist approach.
The results of the meta-analysis conducted by the group led
by Lisa Feldman Barrett and Tor Wager, instead, have been
interpreted as supporting a constructionist view of emotions
(Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012; Wager et al., 2015).
Kober et al. (2008) performed a data-driven co-activation analysis
on every study on emotion, including those that did not
distinguish between different emotion categories, and found
six functional groups. These clusters are considered as the
original and primitive neurofunctional components of “basic
psychological operations” (Lindquist et al., 2012) from whose
interaction and integration emotions emerge. They include
circuitry associated with cognitive and motor functions, such
as language and executive functions, conceptualization, or
visual functions. Lindquist et al. (2012) considered only studies
on discrete emotion categories, and analyzed the density of
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activation in areas of 10 mm which significantly respond to an
emotion in comparison with the activity elicited through the
mean of all other emotions in the same area [e.g., Fear vs.
(Anger + Happiness + Sadness + Disgust)/4]. These authors
reported that it was not possible to isolate unique and specific
neural correlate for each basic emotion, because each area
activated by one emotion was also activated by at least another
basic emotion. Recently, Wager et al. (2015) have proposed
a multivariate meta-analysis based on a hierarchical Bayesian
approach. In addition to generating summary brain activation
maps for each emotion, as was already the case in previous
studies, this method was also able to predict the number and
position of activations from a single study and to calculate the
probability that a new study will contain peaks of activations
within a particular brain region. Although analyses have revealed
that “each emotional category is associated with a unique
and prototypical pattern of activity distributed across multiple
regions” (p. 1), the authors interpret the data as disconfirming
basic emotions theories, as these activation patterns partly
overlap one another, and are linked to other functions considered
primitive, as already reported in previous work by the same
group.
Clearly, the choice of statistical methods in meta-analysis is
crucial and can lead to different results because diverse analyses
inevitably bring assumptions that may emphasize some trends
in the data and underestimate others, even though raw data
are not very different. For example, Vytal and Hamann (2010)
used a standard pairwise comparison, Lindquist et al. (2012)
conducted a density analysis, and Kober et al. (2008) a co-
activation approach. Besides methodological differences, it is
important to bring into focus the criterion implicitly adopted
from the outset to accept or reject the concept of basic emotions –
the existence of a univocal relationship between the neural
structure and emotions – and, consequently, the interpretation
of the results, as we will outline in the next session.
LIMITATIONS OF NEUROIMAGING
STUDIES
What inferences can be made on the basis of fMRI studies? What
are the limitations of the methodology with respect to the debate
on the existence of basic emotions?
A first limit is epistemological. That is, imaging studies are
good at revealing which neural structures are involved in the
processing of basic emotions, but are silent with respect to what
structures are necessary to recognize or express such emotions. In
this sense, they offer a type of ‘weak’ or correlational evidence
and should be interpreted in the light of other data, such as
lesion studies, in which the correlational nature of fMRI data
is elevated to a causal inference (Krakauer et al., 2017). Others
and we tend to believe that the starting point to understand
the neurobiology of emotions is the analysis of behavior, as we
cannot rely solely on the correlational approach of neuroimaging
data devoid of relation with behavioral outcomes. Indeed,
the causal-mechanistic explanations are qualitatively different
from understanding how component modules perform the
computations that then combine to produce behavior (Krakauer
et al., 2017). In order to investigate and understand emotions we
need categories as well as we need to make distinctions among
brain processes, albeit current categories represented by English
words such as “fear,” “anger,” or “disgust” may be too simplistic
(Adolphs, 2017).
To sum up, neuroimaging data and recent meta-analyses
do not seem to us to provide sufficiently solid ground for
rejecting the existence basic emotion at the neurobiological
level. In addition, other features considered typical of basic
emotions, like automaticity or early onset during sensory
processing (Ekman, 1999; see above), are not considered in
these studies. Second, meta-analytic methods combine studies
conducted under different experimental conditions to highlight
‘neural regularities.’ To this end, they dampen methodological
differences of studies that have investigated certain basic
emotions and that, owing to such methodological specificities,
may have given rise to idiosyncratic activations. Most of the
studies on the neural correlates of basic emotions actually
assessed the activations in response to visual recognition of
certain emotional stimuli, typically facial expressions. Other
studies used different visual or auditory stimuli, or asked subjects
to imagine emotional situations and so on, thereby investigating
different aspects and functions of emotional phenomena. The
choice to tackle the neural bases of basic emotions by pooling
together studies so different involves strong and often implicit
assumptions with respect to the nature of emotions. It is plausible
that an a-modal core exists, which responds to emotional content
regardless of the type of stimulus or the sensory modality
that elicits such emotions, or irrespectively of whether we are
evaluating a mental image or an experience induced by the
evaluation of a complex situation, perhaps presented verbally,
with cartoons, and so on (Schirmer and Adolphs, 2017). This
core was indeed reported in the meta-analysis by Feldman Barrett
and Wager, and attributed to the paralimbic and limbic areas
(Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). But it is not obvious
that such a-modal core can also represent the ‘neural marker’ that
distinguishes several basic emotions from others, if the specific
characteristics related to stimulus events and other properties of
the phenomenon are averaged from the outset. These specificities
should not, in fact, necessarily be considered ‘noise,’ and it is
worth remembering that one of the characteristics considered
typical of basic emotions is the presence of specific behavioral
responses and antecedents. In other words, it seems unlikely
that there is a fearful response regardless of specific sensory
events that cause it, the expressive and instrumental responses
associated with it and so on, such as meta-analytic approaches
are led to implicitly assume. Thus, differences in such events may
explain, at least partly, the variability in the activation patterns
related to specific basic emotion categories.
THE STRUCTURE-FUNCTION RELATION
AND BASIC EMOTIONS
As noted above, the results of some meta-analyses, such as those
by Vytal and Hamann (2010) and Lindquist et al. (2012), while
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reporting similar results, came to very different conclusions.
What, then, counts as evidence for deciding whether the results
of neuroimaging support the concept of basic emotions? One
important argument often cited for denying the existence of basic
emotions at the neurobiological level is that meta-analysis data
have shown that each area activated by a basic emotion is also
activated by at least another emotion. Since it is not possible
to identify brain regions that are consistently and uniquely
associated with only one emotion, the latter does not have
dedicated neural underpinning. Such reasoning assumes that
basic emotion theorists are committed to one-to-one relationship
between individual brain areas and mental functions. However, it
is becoming increasingly clear that the correspondence between
brain structure and function is better represented by a one-
to-many relationship, or pluripotentiality (Gallese and Lakoff,
2005; Dehaene and Cohen, 2007; Gallese, 2008; Hurley, 2008;
Pessoa, 2008, 2014; Anderson, 2016). For example, Anderson
et al. (2013) have shown that even the smallest region of the brain
is involved in a multiplicity of cognitive functions and behavioral
categories. Accordingly, the elementary unit of analysis seems to
move from the single neural structure to the distributed network
of dynamic interactions between structures (Bressler and Menon,
2010). The functional role of a single structure is then determined
in part by the interactions that such a structure entertains with
other regions at a given time (Klein, 2012; Scarantino, 2012;
Pessoa, 2017). The network thus assumes a modality defined
as dominant, or a function tends to be expressed with greater
probability through the interaction of certain brain regions,
which may, however, contribute to the expression of a different
task or function when interacting with other structures (Pessoa,
2014) (Figure 1).
It is interesting to note that if the strict criterion of a one-
to-one relationship between structure and function adopted to
criticize basic emotions were adopted in other domains, very
little would remain of the knowledge that underpins cognitive
neurosciences. For example, it is known that auditory stimuli
also activate the primary visual cortex (V1) (Pockett et al., 2013),
and V1 also responds to tactile stimuli (Nordmark et al., 2012).
Likewise, the primary motor area determines not only voluntary
movements, but is also active in various tasks that do not require
the execution or planning of any movement, such as working
memory, language, visual and auditory tasks (Kukleta et al., 2016;
Tomasino and Gremisse, 2016). Moreover, Broca’s area, typically
associated with speech production, is also involved in various
tasks such as preparing the movement and action (Anderson,
2010). If we were to take this logic to the extreme consequences,
we would come to the paradoxical conclusion of having to
abandon concepts like vision, speech or hearing since there is not
a strict one-to-one relationship between these functions and the
neural structures associated with them.
Does the basic emotion view entail a one-to-one mapping
between single brain regions and each basic emotion? Indeed, not
even Ekman (1999) assumed that each basic emotion is associated
with a single brain area; rather, he explicitly spoke of patterns of
activity, which is in fact what some neuroimaging meta-analyses
found. The constructionists, however, deny that such patterns
constitute legitimate neural bases for basic emotions, as they
do not correspond to intrinsic patterns of neural co-activation,
i.e., to the networks found during resting state (Touroutoglou
et al., 2015). Constructionists suggest that only these networks
may reveal the “basic psychological operations” (Lindquist et al.,
2012).
Undoubtedly, the concept of basic emotions requires updating
and reformulation according to more recent neurobiological
principles about brain functioning, including those outlined
above. However, abandoning the one-to-one mapping between
structures and functions does not lead, in principle, to
abandon basic emotions themselves. In fact, “basic psychological
operations,” which have been proposed as the primitive and
elemental constituents of emotions and other mental states
(Lindquist et al., 2012), also seem to necessitate a clearer
operationalization. These functions are supposed to be primitive
insofar as they are linked to ‘intrinsic’ brain networks at
rest, and hence do not hinge on overt behavior. Beyond the
limbic and paralimbic structures that represent the emotionally
undifferentiated core, the authors grouped the remaining brain
structures into four clusters: (1) cognitive and motor clusters
related to language functions, executive and attentional; (2) the
posterior mesial regions cluster related to conceptualization; (3)
the mesial prefrontal cluster, also linked to conceptualization;
FIGURE 1 | Graphical example of different types of structure-function relationships.
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(4) the visual occipital cluster. It is not obvious that these
categories have unique neural correlates, and can guide
research on the relationship between neuronal structures and
mental functions, as well as the comparison between animal
and human neuroscience, better than basic emotions. Which
definition is necessary and sufficient to make “conceptualization”
neurobiologically founded? How many tasks are the mesial
prefrontal structures involved in, or how many non-linguistic
tasks are the structures of the inferior frontal gyrus, typically
involved in speech production, involved in?
An example of how the shift of focus from the individual
structures to networks can be heuristically useful in the study of
the neural correlates of basic emotions is offered by recent fMRI
studies using multivariate techniques (MVPA) or investigating
the dynamic relationships between networks, as a function of
different emotions. Saarimäki et al. (2016) classified the activities
of each voxel in response to six basic emotions, showing that
they are associated with distinct neural networks, though widely
distributed in the brain (but see Clark-Polner et al., 2017 for a
different interpretation). Another recent study has investigated
whether and how the amygdala functional connections vary
depending on the presentation of different facial expressions of
basic emotions (Diano et al., 2017b). The amygdala is in fact
traditionally considered to be involved in the processing of fearful
signals. However, several neuroimaging studies and some meta-
analyses have reported the involvement of the amygdala in the
perception of other basic emotions such as anger, sadness or joy
(Sergerie et al., 2008; Kirby and Robinson, 2015). This result was
initially interpreted as disconfirming the functional specificity
of the amygdala and in contradiction to basic emotions views.
However, applying a method to study the dynamic changes of
the functional connections that the amygdala entertains with the
rest of the brain, we observed that the amygdala recruits different
structures in response to the various basic emotions, so as to
constitute a characteristic functional network for each emotion
(Diano et al., 2017b). For example, during fear processing,
amygdala activity was specifically correlated with activity in
posterior visual areas including V1, fusiform gyrus and superior
temporal sulcus, whereas processing of happiness involved co-
activations with more anterior regions, such as dorso-medial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
The pluripotentiality of the structure-function relationship
and the adoption of network level of analysis as significant units,
instead of individual regions, also raise the need to investigate
the temporal dimension more closely. In fact, the neural regions
that represent the substrate of different basic emotions may,
in principle, remain the same, whereas it is the uniqueness of
the temporal properties of their connections and the synchrony
between them that differentiate between the emotions. The time
dimension is indeed a further definitional criterion of basic
emotions, as originally conceived. For example, fear, anger or
disgust are considered to trigger automatic reflex-like responses
to potentially dangerous events for survival, and these responses
can be adaptive only to the extent that they can be implemented
quickly. Conversely, the speed of responses related to joy or
sadness is probably less relevant and these latter emotions can
unfold at longer time scales. fMRI has a low temporal resolution
(in the order of several seconds) considering the few milliseconds
that characterize neural responses. There is therefore the risk
of observing only the final responses, and of losing information
about the earliest responses. Electroencephalography (EEG)
and magnetoencephalography (MEG) are valid methodological
alternatives, offsetting a relatively limited spatial resolution
compared to fMRI with a time resolution of a few milliseconds.
An exhaustive assessment of these techniques is beyond the scope
of this paper, but we note that using these techniques it has been
possible to investigate and discriminate the temporal and spatial
profiles of neural networks activated in response to different basic
emotions (Eger et al., 2003; Esslen et al., 2004; Morel et al., 2009;
Calvo and Beltrán, 2013; Luo et al., 2013; Costa et al., 2014;
Nakamura et al., 2014; Wang and Bastiaansen, 2014; Candra et al.,
2015; Liu et al., 2015; Mattavelli et al., 2016; Mavratzakis et al.,
2016; Kokinous et al., 2017).
BASIC EMOTIONS AND AWARENESS
Another feature considered characteristic of basic emotions is
their automaticity, or the fact that the sensory processing of
the triggering events, as well as the expression of the responses
associated with them, do not necessarily depend on the awareness
(e.g., Ekman, 1999). It is known that only a fraction of sensory
input gives rise to conscious perceptions. For example, the stimuli
to which we do not pay attention do not become part of our
conscious contents (Kentridge et al., 2004). Also, if the energy
of the stimulus is too low and below the threshold of sensory
detection, or if the stimulus is too short (subliminal), we are not
aware of its presence (Savazzi and Marzi, 2002; Dehaene et al.,
2006). Emotions, and in particular stimuli that communicate
potential threat, however, seem less dependent on attention and
awareness. fMRI studies in which attention was manipulated with
dual tasks showed that expressions of fear presented outside the
attentional focus, and therefore not consciously perceived by the
subjects, often activate the amygdala (Vuilleumier et al., 2001;
Anderson et al., 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2005; but
see Pessoa et al., 2002). Other studies used masking or binocular
rivalry procedures to block conscious perception of the emotional
stimuli (Morris et al., 1998, 1999; Whalen et al., 1998, 2004;
Critchley et al., 2002; Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004; Pasley
et al., 2004; Liddell et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006a,b; Carlson
et al., 2009; Yoon et al., 2009; Juruena et al., 2010). Even in
this case, expressions of fear that were not consciously perceived
activated a subcortical network, typically involving the superior
colliculus, the pulvinar and the amygdala (see Tamietto and de
Gelder, 2010; Diano et al., 2017a, for reviews). These studies were
largely inspired by the seminal work of LeDoux on subcortical
pathways to the amygdala involved in the processing of non-
conscious fearful stimuli (LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux and Brown,
2017).
Particularly interesting are those studies that instead of
experimentally manipulating the attention to or visibility of
the stimuli, have studied patients with neuropsychological
attentional deficits and/or impaired visual awareness. For
example, patients with hemispatial neglect do not pay attention
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to events in the right side of the space and the stimuli that appear
in this side are typically not consciously perceived. However,
fear stimuli projected in the right side activate the amygdala
and can more easily access conscious awareness than neutral
or joyful stimuli (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001; Vuilleumier
et al., 2002; Tamietto et al., 2005, 2007, 2015; Domínguez-borràs
et al., 2012). Another particularly interesting group of patients
are those with ‘blindsight’ (Weiskrantz et al., 1974; Tamietto and
Morrone, 2016). Such patients are clinically blind in a portion of
the visual field as a result of damage to V1. However, they can
discriminate between different expressions, such as joy or fear,
show distinctive mimicking responses and specific physiological
activation, even though they are not aware of the presence of such
stimuli and report subjectively ‘to guess’ (Ladavas et al., 1993; de
Gelder et al., 1999, 2008; de Gelder and Tamietto, 2007; Tamietto
and de Gelder, 2008, 2010; Tamietto et al., 2009, 2012; Van den
Stock et al., 2011b, 2014, 2015; Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al.,
2013, 2014; Celeghin et al., 2015a,b,c; Georgy et al., 2016). These
results challenge a perspective where emotions are generated
through linguistic mediation and conceptualization. However,
they are not in contrasts with higher-order theories of emotional
consciousness that consider the latter as emerging from cortical
circuits also involved in cognitive states of consciousness
(LeDoux and Brown, 2017). According to this view, the difference
between emotional and non-emotional experiences does not
parallel the subcortical vs. cortical distinction, as emotional
consciousness is not instantiated in subcortical areas involved
in the processing of basic sensorial input and responses to
affective signals. Rather, subcortical areas provide non-conscious
input to cortical networks that implement conscious experiences
regardless of their content.
The study of emotional responses in the absence of awareness
also offers a privileged perspective from which to evaluate
another characteristic feature of basic emotions theories: that
of being determined by typical and phylogenetically old stimuli.
Until a few years ago, the most commonly used stimuli in affective
neuroscience and experimental psychology were images of facial
expressions. However, more recent studies have also used body
postures (de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder and Hadjikhani, 2006;
Tamietto et al., 2009, 2015; de Gelder et al., 2010, 2012; Van
den Stock et al., 2011a,b, 2013, 2015). Moreover, stimuli that
represent an ancestral danger, such as snakes and spiders (Öhman
et al., 2001; Öhman, 2009; Troiani and Schultz, 2013) have
also been tested. Typically, all these stimuli can induce specific
psychophysiological responses and can activate the amygdala and
other structures related to the sensory encoding of potentially
dangerous signals (Carlsson et al., 2004; Wendt et al., 2008;
Alpers et al., 2009; Almeida et al., 2015; Tamietto et al., 2015).
Interestingly, the non-conscious processing of facial expressions
related to the so-called social and complex emotions, such
as arrogance, guilt or embarrassment, seems to be abolished
when visual awareness is lacking, as in patients with blindsight
(Celeghin et al., 2016). Similarly, the processing of complex
scenario images designed to evoke emotions seems to rely on
awareness in order to be able to trigger neural responses and
evoke psychophysiological changes typical for that emotion (de
Gelder et al., 2002; Grabowska et al., 2011).
In summary, these studies appear to converge in indicating
that some biologically primitive stimuli, for which we seem
evolutionarily prepared to respond and that are traditionally
associated with basic emotions, can be processed in the absence
of awareness.
BASIC EMOTIONS AND
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PATIENTS
The study of patients with focal brain damage provides evidence
that complements the findings of neuroimaging studies for
several reasons. First, lesion studies offer causal, rather than
merely correlational, evidence with respect to the functional
role of a given neural structure in mediating behavior, and
inform us on how the networks properties are altered by the
absence of a particular component. Also, brain damage can alter
a function in a completely unexpected and unpredictable way,
thus radically changing the way we think about the functional
architecture of the mind/brain (Caramazza, 1986). Lastly, the
study of the constellation of symptoms resulting from the damage
and the possible resolution over time thereof can outline the
many-to-one structure-function relationship, owing to plasticity
processes and/or neural reorganization (Adolphs, 2016). This
aspect, which goes by the name of ‘degeneracy,’ complements
the pluripotentiality, and defines the capacity of structurally
different elements to implement the same function or generate
the same output (Edelman and Gally, 2001; Friston and Price,
2003).
There is a wealth evidence showing that deficits in the
recognition of specific emotions result from focal lesions in
different brain areas (Calder et al., 2001). Adolphs et al. (1994)
first showed how bilateral amygdala damage induces a selective
deficit in the recognition of facial expressions of fear. In later
studies it was also noted that an impaired ability in these
patients to recognize fear is not associated with the normal
ability to discriminate other facial features such as identity
(Adolphs et al., 1995), gender and age (Anderson and Phelps,
2000). These deficits in the recognition and in the experience
of fear as a result of amygdala lesions may extend to other
emotions as well as non-facial stimuli, such as vocal expressions
(Scott et al., 1997; Calder et al., 2000, 2001; Brierley et al.,
2004) body postures (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999), snakes or
spiders (Adolphs et al., 1994, 1995; Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar
et al., 1995; Adolphs, 1999; Feinstein et al., 2011). These
results are not in contradiction with the neuroimaging data
described previously, which also report an involvement of the
amygdala for emotions other than fear, as we have already
discussed.
Patients with a selective lesion to the anterior insula and
basal ganglia, most likely in the pallidum and ventral striatum,
show impaired perception of disgust and experience less disgust
in response to scenes that describe and reproduce bodily
products, violence or repulsive animals (Phillips et al., 1997, 1998;
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; Calder et al., 2000, 2001; Tremblay
et al., 2015). Furthermore, patients with neurodegenerative
diseases involving the insula and basal ganglia (such as
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Huntington’s disease) also show diminished ability to identify the
distaste for bad smells (Mitchell et al., 2005) as well as the inability
to recognize disgust in other people’s faces (Sprengelmeyer
et al., 1996, 1998; Calder et al., 2001; Suzuki et al., 2006;
Kipps et al., 2007; Sprengelmeyer, 2007). Similarly, patients
receiving anterior insula electrical stimulation report visceral
sensations consistent with the experience of disgust (Penfield
and Faulk, 1955), and insula stimulation may cause behavioral
and physiological responses typical of disgust in both, monkeys
(Caruana et al., 2011) and humans (Papagno et al., 2016). Lesion
and neuroimaging evidence thus support the idea that basal
ganglia take part directly in the processing of disgust, rather than
being simply involved by proximity and interconnections with
the insula.
Orbitofrontal cortex lesions cause pathological manifestations
of anger and lack of self-control, as is well known from the classic
case of the patient Phineas Gage (Damasio, 1994). More recent
studies have shown that patients with lesions to the orbitofrontal
cortex become irritable more easily and use verbal (but not
physical) aggression more frequently compared to neurologically
healthy subjects (Grafman et al., 1996). Psychopathy and
antisocial disorders are marked by an increase in aggression,
which relates to a structural (Raine et al., 2000) and functional
change in the orbitofrontal cortex (Glenn et al., 2009; Yang
et al., 2009; Harenski et al., 2010). One study also found that
individuals with borderline personality disorder have lower
metabolic activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and are more
prone to aggression toward others (Goyer et al., 1994).
All things considered, neuropsychological studies bear
inevitable limitations, and cannot be the unique basis to
refute or accept any hypothesis about neural architecture of
mental functions. The study of selected patients presents with
limitations, especially in regard to replicability of the results
because of the intrinsic variability (etiology, extension, age) of
each patient (e.g., Premi et al., 2016). However, neuropsychology
is clearly not committed to build up a different model of antomo-
functional correlations for each case studied. What patients
studies can reveal is that each patient performance potentially
provide a relevant evidence for a model of the neural bases
and organization of mental functions (Caramazza, 1986). So
far, it appears to us that the bulk of evidence lend support to
the existence of relatively segregated neural networks for the
processing of different basic emotions.
INTERIM CONCLUSION
In this review, we summarized a number of studies and themes
that have recently revitalized the debate about the existence
of the neurobiological basis of emotion. We believe that,
when considered alone, neuroimaging data are not sufficient
to disconfirm the concept of basic emotions, especially when
derived from ‘resting state’ experiments. Furthermore, meta-
analytical studies appear to be heavily influenced not only by
methodological choices, but also by the theoretical assumptions
that are not always explicit. The need to previously define which
evidence may apply for or against the existence of basic emotions
is underlined by the fact that similar results have given rise
to conflicting interpretations. The assumption of a one-to-one
relationship between neural structures and mental functions is
a central argument for the rejection of basic emotions in a
neurobiological perspective by those who adopt a constructivist
theoretical approach.
We interpret current findings as suggesting that the
neurobiological existence of basic emotions is still tenable and
heuristically seminal, pending some reformulation. Moving the
focus of neuroscientific research from individual brain regions
to networks, and from the simplistic region-based one-to-
one localizations to more sophisticated network-based one-to-
many relationship between neural structure and function seems
to prefigure a more modern and neurobiologically plausible
approach to the study of basic emotions. Finally, we argued
that is important to consider, along with neuroimaging data,
evidence from behavior in healthy subjects and patients with focal
brain damage. When these findings are considered conjointly,
the picture seems to us in favor of the neurobiological existence
of basic emotions, albeit in a not entirely univocal way. The
discrepancies that still exist reflect methodological limitations,
the need to update and reformulate too rigid definitional criteria
with respect to what the basic emotions are (Scarantino, 2015),
and require a clearer distinction between the psychological,
biological and conceptual profiles in ‘basicness’ of emotions.
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